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1. Introduction
There is a growing body of literature that deals with outward foreign direct investment
(OFDI) from Russia and the international activities of Russian multinational enterprises
(MNEs). However, despite the significant public attention devoted to Russia, and
relatively widespread fears of Russian capital, there is very little academic research on
the presence of Russian capital in Central and East Europe. Only a few studies have
examined in detail the entire region or even parts of it (Pelto et al., 2004; Weiner, 2006;
Chetverikova, 2010; Kalotay et al., 2014). Moreover, only a few CEE country studies
have been conducted, including studies on Bulgaria (Zashev, 2005a), Hungary (Weiner,
2011a, 2011b, 2013), Poland (Liuhto, 2002; Runiewicz, 2005), Latvia (Zashev, 2005b)
and Lithuania (Zashev, 2004). Although Hungary is among the exceptions, an English-
language study has yet to be published.
This paper has two main purposes. The first is to review what the various official
statistics tell us about Russian FDI in Hungary (Section 2). The other is to arrive at a
more comprehensive understanding of major Russian FDI projects in Hungary, by
analysing company data in meticulous detail (Section 3). In these case studies, we
consider the main characteristics of Russian investments in Hungary, including, among
other things, (1) the industries targeted by Russian investors; (2) the way in which
Russian investors enter the market (greenfield projects, acquisitions or joint ventures);
(3) the motivations behind investment decisions; (4) the failure or success of investment
projects; (5) the ownership structures of the investing entities (with special attention to
potential links to the Russian government); (6) the Russian share in the investment; (7)
the role of indirect FDI/trans-shipment (investment through a third country). We
investigate whether the top Russian non-financial MNEs (Table 12) are present in
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Hungary, and whether there are significant FDI projects on the horizon. We only briefly
touch on the prevailing Hungarian attitude towards Russian investments.3
2. What do the statistics say about Russian FDI in Hungary?
The central banks of both Hungary and Russia (MNB and CBR, respectively) and the
Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) provide data on the actual size of Russian
FDI in Hungary:
– the MNB has provided data on Russian FDI flows into Hungary since 2001, and on
Russian stocks in Hungary since the end of 2001.4
– the CBR presents comparable data on Russian FDI flows into and stocks in Hungary
since 2007 and the end of 2009, respectively.
– Rosstat circulates a limited selection of data.5
These statistical data sets show that
(1) Russian FDI plays a limited role in Hungary, and Hungary is not an important
destination for Russian FDI in Central and Eastern Europe. This provides a contrast
to the fact that Russia is a key player among the countries with the highest share of
Hungarian imports of goods on account of its shipments of oil and gas (it occupies
a stable position in second or third place, depending on whether the principle applied
is “country of origin” or “country of departure”); and
(2) the statistical data mainly reflect the activities of two players, the Rakhimkulov
family (i.e. Megdet Rakhimkulov and his sons, Ruslan Rakhimkulov and Timur
Rakhimkulov) and of Surgutneftegaz, Russia’s third-largest oil producer.
According to the CBR, at the end of 2013 Hungary’s share in total Russian outward
FDI stock was only 0.07 percent, putting Hungary in 11th place among the Central and
East European countries, with only USD 316 million (Table 2; CBR, 2014). Only five
CEE countries ranked behind Hungary.6 At the end of both 2009 and 2010, a totally
different situation was observed, as Russian FDI stocks in Hungary had surged. According
to the CBR, Russian FDI stock in Hungary reached USD 2.3 billion and USD 2.2
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billion in 2009 and 2010, respectively.7 These figures are connected to Surgutneftegaz’s
21.2 percent stake in the Hungarian oil and gas company Mol. Acquired in 2009, and
subsequently sold in 2011, this stake is considered the single largest item of Russian
FDI in Hungary. The deal was highly significant for both countries.
From the Russian point of view, it presents evidence that even during the financial and
economic crisis of 2008/2009, there were still very large Russian OFDIs registered:
– The Surgutneftegaz deal occupied the sixth and seventh places among the top outward
merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions from Russia between 2007 and 2009 and
between 2007 and 2010, respectively (Kuznetsov et al., 2011; Kuznetsov, 2011).
– CBR data shows that in 2009 Hungary was the seventh largest recipient of FDI flows
from Russia (CBR, 2015b). At the end of both 2009 and 2010, in terms of the stock
of Russian FDI, Hungary ranked first among the CEE countries, ahead of Bulgaria,
Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Montenegro. Despite these regional rankings,
however, stock data from the CBR suggests that at the end of 2009 and 2010, Hungary
took only the 17th and 19th places among the most attractive Russian FDI destinations
in the world, with respective shares of 0.75 and 0.61 percent (CBR, 2014).
Looking at this from the Hungarian perspective: Although in 2009 Russia was among
the largest investors in Hungary (without special purpose entities or SPEs and using
BPM5 methodology: in the category “equity capital” – first place; in “equity capital
and reinvested earnings” – second place; in “equity capital, reinvested earnings and other
capital” – third place) (MNB, 2014c8),9 the one strong year did not have a major impact
in terms of its low share in the overall FDI stock in Hungary: with a 1.6 percent share
of total FDI stock, it was still only in 11th place in the ranking of countries with FDI
in Hungary (also excluding SPEs and using BPM5 methodology) (MNB, 2014a10).11
With the help of the MNB, we looked at what the Hungarian statistics really indicate.12
Quarterly data reported by the MNB on Russian FDI in Hungary between 2001 and
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201413 (only equity capital) clearly show that meaningful transactions only transpired
in three quarters of three different years,14 including (1) the second quarter of 2008 (EUR
-677.4 million), (2) the second quarter of 2009 (EUR 789.7 million) and (3) the third
quarter of 2011 (EUR -1,860.8 million). These numbers are the same with or without
SPEs.
The data provided for these three quarters reflect only a single transaction in each of
these quarters, including one relating to the Rakhimkulovs and two connected to
Surgutneftegaz.
– The first transaction is connected to Kafijat Investment and Asset Management Zrt.,
which used to be Megdet Rakhimkulov’s large family business (see the details below
in Section 3.1). The MNB informed us that according to the information found in the
Complex Céghírek, a business registration database of companies in Hungary, from
April 2008 onwards Kafijat had Cyprus-based owners. This change of ownership
was recorded in the balance of payments. According to CompLex Céghírek, the
ownership stakes of Megdet Rakhimkulov, Ruslan Rakhimkulov and Timur
Rakhimkulov were discontinued on 30 April 2008, while on the same day the Cyprus-
based AWB Consulting Services Ltd. and Charing Investments Ltd., i.e. the companies
of the Rakhimkulov brothers, acquired Kafijat.15 At the general meeting held on 30
April 2008, due to divestment, Kafijat’s share capital was reduced substantially, from
HUF 98.45 billion to HUF 10.45 billion, with effect from 30 April 2008, and huge
dividends were paid (Complex Céghírek; HVG, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). The capital
reduction is linked to the investors from Cyprus.16; 17
– The second and the third balances are linked to the acquisition and sale of shares in
Mol. But the figures that the MNB published for 2009 are far below the EUR 1.4 billion
amount that was publicly disseminated. According to the MNB, the reason for this
difference is that Mol was involved in the transaction as a third party (i.e. Mol’s
shares were acquired and then sold, and the company itself was neither a buyer nor
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a seller), so the acquisition transaction was not accounted on the basis of the value
that was reported in the press, but was instead calculated on the basis of the stock
price multiplier (note that Surgutneftegaz paid double the market price) because “Mol
as the data provider was not aware of the figure that appeared in the press”.18
The flow data for 2007 (Tables 11–13; MNB, 2014c, 2014d, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) does
not tell us why the stock figures (Tables 4–6; MNB, 2014a, 2014b, 2015d, 2015e)
increased dramatically from the end of 2006 (amounting to EUR 17.1 million without
SPEs and to EUR 19.4 million with SPEs) through the end of 2007 (amounting to EUR
697.3 million without SPEs and to EUR 699.8 million with SPEs).19 The MNB said that
the increase in the stock of Russian FDI was linked to Kafijat and its owner, who had
changed his residency status during that year: Megdet Rakhimkulov, who had been a
Hungarian investor, turned into a Russian investor (in other words, he moved back to
Russia in 2007), thus the Russian FDI stock increased without any transactions.20; 21
These data, however, do not capture the whole picture about Russian FDI in Hungary.
The main problem is that in many cases investments are routed through a third country
(indirect FDI, trans-shipment). One does not necessarily need to think of this third-country
company as a special purpose entity (including/or a holding company; see Dippelsman,
2004), which can be either offshore or not, with the corresponding taxation, regulatory
and confidentiality benefits (Tavakoli, 2003; IMF, 2004). It has happened, for example,
that a foreign manufacturing company with a Hungarian subsidiary was taken over by
Russian owners (specifically, Austria’s Vogel & Noot, which also has subsidiaries in
Hungary, among other countries, was sold to the Russians, see Section 3.7).
Furthermore, there are two other problems that must be addressed when executing
searches in the Hungarian company registration database on companies with Russian
owners. First, “cascading investments” (i.e. “multi-layered structures”)22 may hide the
nationality of the ultimate owners. This refers to companies that are set up or acquired
in Hungary by Russian interests but are registered as Hungarian companies. The second
problem is that joint-stock companies (“rt.” in Hungarian) are not required to disclose
their ownership structure in Hungary.23 There is information about share ownership in
the documents kept by the courts of registry and in the companies’ financial statements,
but not every joint-stock company discloses this information in the register of companies.
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In 2015, 118 companies in the MNB’s registry were noted as having Russian FDI stock
(compared to 103 in 2012).24 But the small and thus omitted items do not substantially
distort the numbers.
Citing unnamed Russian sources – but essentially just reiterating information that had
already been circulated by its predecessor, ITD Hungary –, the Hungarian Investment
and Trade Agency (HITA) claimed that over 2,000 joint ventures with Russian ownership
were operating in Hungary.25 The Russian trade representation in Hungary also has
information about some 2,000 companies with Russian shareholders, mainly small and
medium-sized enterprises (Hancz, 2012; Hvg.hu, 2012).26 We cannot provide more
accurate data because of indirect FDI, “cascading investments” and problems related
to the disclosure of ownership of joint-stock companies.27
In his presentations delivered in both October 2009 and February 2010, György Gilyán,
then Hungary’s ambassador to Russia, said Russian direct investment capital had mainly
preferred the real estate, commercial, financial, energy and infrastructure-related
industries in Hungary (Gilyán, 2009, 2010).
3. Case studies of Russian investment
3.1. The Rakhimkulov family
Since he has played a significant role in Hungary right from the start – both as a top
Russian investor on his own account and as a representative of Gazprom-related interests
–, Megdet Rakhimkulov, a former Gazprom official, is undoubtedly an ideal starting
point for tracing Russian investors and investment in Hungary. Though he was listed
as Hungary’s richest businessman in 2005 by the Hungarian daily Népszabadság,
Rakhimkulov’s fortune was insufficient to secure such a prominent place in Russia, let
alone worldwide. Nevertheless, the total wealth of the Rakhimkulov family can be
considered very significant.28 Also, Megdet Rakhimkulov was recognised as one of the
most influential foreigners in Hungary (Haszon, 2008). He used to say that the yardstick
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whereby he decided that his investment had been a success and it was time to withdraw
was the point where the company reached a 50 percent profit margin.
The General Banking and Trust (ÁÉB) was a crown jewel among the Rakhimkulov family
assets. ÁÉB was acquired in 1996 by Gazprombank (then controlled by the gas giant
Gazprom29), and was gradually taken over by the Rakhimkulovs’ family company, the
Hungarian-registered Kafijat, and its London-based subsidiary, Firthlion Ltd.30 Megdet
Rakhimkulov became ÁÉB’s president in 1996, and then the company’s president and
CEO in 1997.
Incorporated in 1997, Kafijat was used to acquire direct or indirect stakes in Hungarian
companies. A number of companies merged into Kafijat, and, finally, at the end of 2007,
so did ÁÉB31 (see the details in Section 3.5). The significance of Kafijat was highlighted
by the fact that in 2008 the company had amassed the sixth largest net income (after-
tax profit) among Hungarian-registered companies (HVG, 2010).
ÁÉB and other Russian-interest companies also held stakes in Zalakerámia, Hungary’s
largest tile manufacturer; this investment was tainted by scandals.32 However, the major
scandals took place surrounding the deals concerning Hungary’s petrochemical
manufacturers BorsodChem and TVK, as well as the aforementioned oil and gas
corporation Mol (see the details in Section 3.3). Megdet Rakhimkulov appeared in
every case. Moreover, in the mid-2000s, the Rakhimkulov family was reported as the
largest shareholder in BorsodChem. The Rakhimkulov family also held stakes in Antenna
Hungária Rt., Hungary’s terrestrial broadcaster, and still owns the largest share in
Hungary’s leading retail bank, OTP Bank Nyrt., with a roughly 9 percent stake. In
2002, Megdet Rakhimkulov resigned from the position of the chairman of the board of
directors of Panrusgáz (then Panrusgáz Hungarian–Russian Gas Industry Rt., now
Panrusgáz Gas Trading Zrt.), an intermediary company for Russian gas imports delivered
to the successor of Hungarian gas incumbent E.ON Natural Gas Trade Zrt., Hungarian
Gas Trade Zrt., a subsidiary of Hungary’s state-owned MVM Hungarian Electricity Zrt.
Timur Rakhimkulov, a minority shareholder, was intended to be the majority owner of
Business Telecom Nyrt., or BTel, a Hungarian telecom provider, via his Hungarian-
registered company SkillInvest Kft. BTel is in a very difficult position. Previously,
SkillInvest had been identified as BTel’s saviour, but ultimately it emerged that it would
not perform a capital increase of nearly HUF 1 billion, claiming at the end of 2014 that
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not all the necessary information had been available. This is the latest scandal to hit the
Rakhimkulovs. The Rakhimkulov family has faced several scandals concerning their
activities in Hungary.
3.2. Gas
Although a new gas market situation – as evidenced by gas oversupply, the emerging
role of market-based gas pricing and the possibility of buying gas more cheaply than
provided by the oil product-linked contracts33 – began to unfold in Continental Europe
at the end of 2008, Russian gas still has a decisive role in Hungary’s gas industry, and
Russia remains the single largest gas supplier to Hungary. On the other hand, Hungary
is among the Gazprom group’s largest customers in the CEE region. Yet despite the
significance of Russian gas in Hungary’s gas imports, as well as plans to expand into
Hungary, state-controlled Gazprom still plays a limited role as an investor, and the issue
of the unbundling of transmission assets under the Third Energy Package for an internal
gas and electricity market in the EU further limits its abilities. Both in the case of the
oil and gas industries in Hungary, Russian oil and gas companies found themselves unable
to control the entire value chain from wellhead to final customer. Gazprom’s main
ownership interest in Hungary is Panrusgáz. In addition, Gazprom also has stakes in
two gas traders. The other plans and projects have all failed.
3.2.1. Gas import intermediation
Established in 1994, Panrusgáz is the first link in the chain of Russian gas imports.
Panrusgáz sells all the gas it imports to Hungarian Gas Trade. The Russian shareholders
of Panrusgáz are Gazprom Export, a company fully owned by Gazprom which serves
as its export arm (it owns 40 percent of the shares), and the Hungarian-registered gas
trader Centrex Hungary Zrt. (which holds 10 percent of Panrusgáz shares). Centrex
Hungary is an affiliate of the Gazprombank-controlled and Vienna-based Centrex
Europe Energy & Gas AG. Centrex Hungary bought Interprokom’s 10 percent stake in
Panrusgáz in the autumn of 2006 (Világgazdaság, 2006). Currently, Gazprom Export
has two long-term gas supply contracts with Hungary, including the major one with
Hungarian Gas Trade through Panrusgáz (signed in 1996 for the period 1996–201534),
and a small contract with Centrex Hungary (concluded in 2007 for the period 2008–2028).
Originally, it was intended that Panrusgáz would also help with the exports of Hungarian
products to Russia. Panrusgáz was forced to pay the Hungarian state significant amounts
in the form of a “crisis tax”35, prompting the company in December 2010 to ask the
Hungarian energy regulator to revoke its gas trading licence, which the Hungarian
Energy Office did in February 2011. Consequently, the Hungarian partner (first E.ON
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Natural Gas Trade and then, between September 2011 and June 2013, Germany’s E.ON
Ruhrgas AG, and now E.ON Natural Gas Trade’s successor, Hungarian Gas Trade) has
been taking the gas abroad from Panrusgáz, with new delivery points, including
Baumgarten (Austria) and Beregovo (Ukraine) (B. Horváth, 2011; Magyar Energiahivatal,
2011).
3.2.2. Gas traders
Among Hungarian gas traders, three have Russian owners and, as previously mentioned,
Gazprom has stakes in two of these three.
1. One of them is the above-mentioned Centrex Hungary, which was incorporated in
2004.
2. Established in 2010, the second company is the Russo–German WIEE Hungary Kft.,
which received a gas trading license in Hungary in February 2011. Its ultimate owners
are Gazprom and the BASF Group’s Wintershall of Germany.36
3. MET Hungary Zrt. is a third trader, an obscure company that generates huge amounts
of cash and is partially owned by Russian interests. MET Hungary (formerly Mol
Energy Trade Kft. and then Mol Energy Trade Zrt.) was set up in 2007 by Mol, and
became half-owned by the Belize-based Normeston Trading Ltd. in late 2009. In 2012,
Normeston’s stake was sold to RP Explorer Liquid Fund Ltd., a company registered
in the Cayman Islands. The only information that has so far been released is that
Normeston is or was owned by a Russian national (European Commission, 2009).
The Hungarian watchdog NGO Atlatszo.hu speculated that Rakhimkulov was behind
Normeston (Sarkadi Nagy, 2013). After much speculation, it turned out in early 2015
that the current Russian owner of MET Hungary is Ilya Trubnikov, a Russian–Canadian
citizen, with a 12.7 percent stake (Magyari, 2015).
A recent Russian plan was to invest in liquefied natural gas (LNG) and compressed natural
gas (CNG) filling stations in Hungary.37 In October 2014, Gazprom Export said that
its first filling station could open in 2015 or 2016. In Hungary, this market is very small,
and it offers minor opportunities at best (B. Horváth, 2014).
3.2.3. Gas pipeline, storage and hub: A list of unsuccessful projects
Gazprom’s other plans and projects in Hungary involve failures. After the failures of
the BorsodChem and TVK transactions, Gazprom obtained no interest in Mol’s gas
business, and neither underground gas storages nor gas pipelines have been built.38
It seemed that after the partial sale of Mol’s gas business, Gazprom would be able to
acquire positions in Hungary. In the middle of the 2000s, E.ON Ruhrgas acquired the
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wholesale, marketing and trading unit Mol Natural Gas Supply Rt. (subsequently
renamed E.ON Natural Gas Trade), the storage unit Mol Natural Gas Storage Rt.
(subsequently renamed E.ON Natural Gas Storage) and half of Panrusgáz. Under the
2006 swap agreement between E.ON and Gazprom, Gazprom was to receive 50 percent
minus one vote in both E.ON Natural Gas Storage and E.ON Natural Gas Trade, as well
as 25 percent plus one vote in the electricity provider E.ON Hungaria Energy Zrt. (and,
in addition to these, it was also due to receive EUR 1.2 billion) in exchange for a 25
percent minus one vote in the Yuzhno-Russkoye field located in Western Siberia.
Ultimately, the deal was concluded without involving Hungarian ownership.
In Hungary’s gas industry, Hungarian state-owned power company MVM has become
established as the main player in no time. By purchasing E.ON Natural Gas Storage
and E.ON Natural Gas Trade, MVM has emerged both as the largest gas trader and
commercial gas storage company. Also, MVM had previously gained a foothold in
Hungary’s gas transmission39 and took E.ON’s place in Panrusgáz.
Gazprom’s joint projects with Mol in Hungary did not turn out to be fruitful. Their two
joint ventures, SEP Company Consulting Kft. and Pusztaföldvár Gas Storage Zrt., went
into voluntary liquidation and were deleted from the registry in 2014 and 2012,
respectively.
In 2006, Mol and Gazprom set up the SEP Company to examine the possibilities of
extending the trans-Black Sea Blue Stream gas pipeline (running from Russia to Turkey),
as well as the construction of underground gas storage facilities and the creation of a
gas trading hub in Hungary, but none of the ideas were implemented.
As for the trans-Black Sea gas pipeline, in early 2008 an intergovernmental agreement
was signed between Hungary and Russia for the Hungarian section of South Stream,
though not for the corresponding section of Blue Stream.40 Moreover, instead of Mol,
the Hungarian state-run Hungarian Development Bank (MFB) Zrt. was selected as the
Hungarian partner in the venture. But the joint venture (South Stream Hungary Zrt.)
was only registered in March 2010. MVM bought up MFB’s stake in 2012.41 The
European onshore sections of South Stream were subject to the Third Gas Directive,
so the problems of third-party access, transportation tariffs and unbundling should have
been resolved. It has been known since the very beginning that the intergovernmental
agreements on South Stream will not comply with the Third Gas Directive. And the
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European onshore sections did not apply to the respective national energy regulators
for exemptions from the above provisions of the Directive.42 The European Commission
required the concerned South Stream countries to either renegotiate or cancel their
intergovernmental agreements.43 Finally, Russia unexpectedly abandoned the South
Stream project on 1 December 2014. In place of South Stream, Russia has proposed to
build an undersea pipeline to Turkey (which is neither an EU member nor an Energy
Community Contracting Party), with the same capacity as South Stream (dubbed Turkish
Stream by Turkey).
Regarding the joint project of Mol and Gazprom to construct an underground gas
storage facility, after the abandonment of the project the joint venture Pusztaföldvár Gas
Storage, which had originally been registered in early 2010, was placed under voluntary
liquidation in October 2011. According to the Hungarian economic daily Világgazdaság,
Mol revised its cost estimates for the project, and as they exceeded the original figures
by an order of two, the new numbers proved too high (Világgazdaság, 2011b). In March
2009, at the time when the contract to set up the joint venture was signed, Mol had planned
to construct a facility with a capacity of 1.3 billion cubic meters, which was expected
to start operating around 2012-2013 (Mol, 2009). E.ON Natural Gas Storage claimed
that measured by its gas consumption, Hungary was a great power in terms of gas
storage, and the total gas storage capacity demonstrated that there was no need for
further expansion (gáz.áram, 2011). It is fairly common for Gazprom to offer its partners
a storage project.
In 2014, there were reports in the media that the Hungarian government planned to sell
gas storage facilities to Gazprom, but the government denied this assertion (Kósa,
2014). After President Putin’s visit to Hungary at the beginning of 2015, the Hungarian
Prime Minister said that Hungary had expected Putin to ask for a stake in the Hungarian
gas storage facilities, but ultimately Putin had not done so. In any case, no ownership
stakes would have been made available for sale (Hvg.hu, 2015b).
Already in the 1990s Gazprom had been present, albeit indirectly, in Hungary’s regional
gas distribution. Milford Holdings Ltd., a company registered in Ireland, held a 19.91
percent stake in South Lowlands Gas Distribution (Dégáz) Rt., while Undall International
Ltd., registered in the British Virgin Islands, acquired a 12.93 percent stake in North-
Transdanubian Gas Distribution (Égáz) Rt. Both foreign investing companies were
considered to belong to Gazprom’s sphere of interest. Ultimately, these shares probably
ended up with Mol. Subsequently, Milford became known for its role in the hostile
takeover attempt of BorsodChem (Fn24, 1997; Napi Gazdaság, 2000; Origó, 2000b;
Magyar Hírlap, 2000c).
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42 According to Article 36(6) of 2009/73/EC, major new gas infrastructure may be exempted from these
provisions.
43 An interview with Katya Yafimava by RT (RT, 2014a).
3.3. Petrochemical market
Since 2003, Gazprom has no stake in either BorsodChem or TVK, despite its previous
plans and acquisitions in this area, i.e. the controversial hostile takeovers of 2000–2002,
which featured the use of Milford and Sibur International Ltd. and also involved the
help of Megdet Rakhimkulov.
The supply chain that links TVK, Mol and BorsodChem is as follows. TVK’s olefin
plants convert naphtha, diesel and liquefied gases purchased from Mol into ethylene
and propylene to be processed into polyethylene and polypropylene in TVK’s polymer
plants. A part of TVK’s ethylene is sold to BorsodChem. The cracking co-products of
TVK’s olefin plants are used by Mol (TVK, 2014). TVK owns the ethylene pipeline
connecting TVK and the Hungary/Ukraine border (which originates from the Ukrainian
chemicals producer Oriana), while the link between TVK and BorsodChem is owned
by BorsodChem (GVH, 2001).
The takeover story began in early September 2000, when it turned out that Milford had
increased its stake in BorsodChem to 24.8 percent. Although Milford’s ownership
structure was not disclosed, market players were all aware that Milford had been acting
on behalf of Gazprom. Gazprom, however, strongly denied this assumption (Magyar
Hírlap, 2000c; Magyar Tôkepiac, 2000). At that time, BorsodChem was TVK’s largest
shareholder. By acquiring BorsodChem, Gazprom would have controlled both companies.
This would have been contrary to the interests of Mol (Magyar Hírlap, 2000b).
Consequently, Mol and BorsodChem responded immediately and, through a variety of
transactions, Mol became the largest shareholder of TVK, and as a result, BorsodChem’s
share in TVK fell by half. Before the official announcement of these transactions,
Milford admitted that the company was part of Gazprom’s sphere of interest (Magyar
Hírlap, 2000d). The Russian side reacted menacingly to the planned Hungarian actions.
Megdet Rakhimkulov, Milford’s representative, suggested Russia would be forced to
reconsider its food and drug imports from Hungary if the issue was not resolved
(Karnitschnig, 2000). Rakhimkulov claimed that the ethylene pipeline had been one of
the main reasons Gazprom become involved in BorsodChem, noting that the goal was
the “creation of a pan-European ethylene pipeline that would include Russia, Ukraine,
Hungary and some other European countries” (The Moscow Times, 2000). But in
October 2000, it was not Gazprom but Lukoil that won a tender to purchase a 50 percent
stake in Oriana (Jagger, 2000). In December 2000, Lukoil and Oriana established a joint
venture, Lukor (Gurtovoy, 2007). Still, in October 2000, Sibur took an option to purchase
Milford’s stake. Reportedly, Gazprom already controlled Sibur, but Sibur was not a
Gazprom subsidiary (Magyar Hírlap, 2000a). It was only later that Gazprom acquired
a 51 percent control of Sibur’s shares. In early 2001, Milford’s stake was bought by
Hungary’s CIB Bank. Founded by Heinrich Pecina and registered in Vienna, VCP
Vienna Capital Partners Unternehmensberatungs AG and its subsidiaries also appeared
on the scene. VCP stressed that it had no direct or indirect ownership links to Russian
companies (Molnár, 2000). VCP acquired a controlling stake in BorsodChem already
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in 2001, but Mol prevented the Austrian company from achieving such a position in
TVK. In June 2001, Sibur took over the shares that had been temporarily held by CIB
Bank (GVH, 2001). In 2002, it was again Milford’s turn to take ownership of that
package, but, finally, Milford unloaded its stake in BorsodChem in 2003. For a while,
MDM Bank in Moscow was also one of the owners of BorsodChem. According to MDM
Bank, it bought the shares at the request of Gazprom, and so did VCP (Origó, 2000a;
Novolodskaya, 2000). Sibur and hence Gazprom as well were more interested in the
acquisition of TVK than in buying BorsodChem. In and of itself, BorsodChem was not
that interesting for Gazprom (Hlavay, 2001). In the end, VCP stopped controlling
BorsodChem in 2004. The Rakhimkulov family got out of BorsodChem in December
2006.44 However, the story of TVK ended only in 2007, when Mol acquired a package
of 31.56 percent of the company’s shares from a subsidiary of VCP.
3.4. Oil
Investment in Hungary’s oil industry has also included plenty of failed efforts, including
those of Yukos, Surgutneftegaz, Lukoil and Gazprom Neft.
Yukos. Unlike the oil company Lukoil, the now defunct Russian oil producer Yukos did
not have a retail business in Hungary. Yukos was present in Hungary through its rep-
resentation and Orion Electronics Kft., a company engaged in business activities outside
of Yukos’ core activities. Before the company was destroyed and its assets were
appropriated, Yukos, a private company, was the most important oil producer in Russia
in 2003 (Shearman & Sterling, 2014). Its main production unit was Yuganskneftegaz.
In 2003, Mol concluded a major long-term oil supply contract with Yukos. Thus the
Yukos situation directly affected Mol, which signed a contract with Lukoil in early 2005.
Yukos’ representation for the Central and East European region was located in Budapest.
Yukos was actively promoting the integration of the Druzhba and Adria crude oil
pipelines. The name Yuganskneftegaz did not first come up during the confiscation of
Yukos’ assets in the 2000s. For a little while after its privatization (from 1992 to 1993),
today’s Orion Electronics, which provides electronics manufacturing and marketing and
distribution services, was called Yuganskneftegaz Electronics Kft., and, from 1993 to
1997, it was operating under the name of Yuganskorionneftegaz Electronics Kft. The
company has been under Singaporean control since 1997. In Orion Electronics, Yukos
was replaced by Rosneft, which absorbed most of Yukos’ assets and thus became
Russia’s largest oil producer, the state oil champion. 
Lukoil. Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer (and the largest privately-owned
oil producer), began to be active in Hungary at the turn of 2003/2004. It already had a
Hungarian presence before that time, however, through its trade representation and
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44 In April 2007, Hungary’s financial-market regulator PSZÁF fined Megdet Rakhimkulov HUF 250
million for insider trading concerning the July 2006 call option agreement regarding BorsodChem
shares.
Stavrochem Chemical Trading Kft., a wholesaler of chemical products. Lukoil became
involved in the Hungarian motor fuels retail and wholesale market in 2004. Its Hungarian
subsidiary, Lukoil Downstream Hungary Kft., launched its activities in the area of
diesel fuels wholesale in March 2004. This was followed by entry into the fuel retail
market in June 2004, where the company began its activities by leasing and operating
15 Hungarian filling stations of AVA Mineralölhandel AG (formerly Avanti) (GVH,
2005).44 Lukoil’s network of filling stations was built by acquiring independently
operated, Avanti and Jet filling stations (the latter had belonged to the US company
ConocoPhillips), as well as by greenfield investment. But Lukoil’s ambitious expansion
plans in Hungary failed to materialize. Before selling its filling stations at the end of
2014, Lukoil, through its Dutch-based subsidiary, had a network of only 75 filling
stations in Hungary – a small figure when compared to the total of almost 1,700 filling
stations operating in Hungary. Lukoil ranked sixth in terms of the numbers of filling
stations, behind Mol, Shell, Agip, OMV and Avia (Major, 2013). According to data from
Lukoil, the company controlled 6 percent of the retail market in Hungary in 2013
(Lukoil, 2013, 2014). Examining the Hungarian retail gasoline market for the period
2007–2008, Farkas et al. (2009) found that the prices of the vertically integrated Lukoil
had been among the lowest in Hungary, and Lukoil may potentially have been the
greatest source of competitive pressure on the market. Meanwhile, vertically integrated
Mol and OMV were selling fuel at higher-than-average prices. The motor fuels sold by
Lukoil Hungary Kft. were supplied both from Hungary’s Mol Duna Refinery and
Romania’s Petrotel-Lukoil Refinery (Világgazdaság, 2011a).46 Due to the “crisis tax”
in Hungary, Lukoil Hungary returned its wholesale fuel licence in 2010 (Marnitz, 2010),
but returned to the market at a later point in time (B. Horváth, 2013). In 2014, Lukoil
decided to withdraw from the Central European region. Lukoil argues the selling off
its European assets helps the company better focus on Russian projects (RT, 2014b).
But analysts believe the EU and US sanctions have certainly contributed to this decision.
Such assessments notwithstanding, among the Russian oil and gas companies that have
been operating in Hungary thus far, the sanctions imposed by the EU only affect
Gazprom Neft. In the meanwhile, US sanctions hit Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil
and Surgutneftegaz as well (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2014a, 2014b; Council
Regulation, 2014a, 2014b). Lukoil’s Hungarian and Slovakian filling stations were
acquired by Norm Benzinkút Kft., which is registered in Hungary but also has some
connections to Russia.47
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45 Lukoil Hungary Kft. was established after Nekom Commercial Kft. merged into Lukoil Downstream
Hungary Kft. in 2005. Nekom was established by AVA AG in 2004 in order to sell its filling stations.
46 Fuels from the Romanian refinery comply with the Euro 5 standards (Lukoil, 2011). However, a
Hungarian expert told this author that even at their peak, the amounts arriving from Romania were minor
(personal communication, 14 May 2015).
47 It is a joint venture between IMFA Petroleum Kft. (created by a former Hungarian representative of Yukos)
and the above-mentioned Belize-based Normeston.
Surgutneftegaz. Surgutneftegaz’s stake in Mol was bought from Austria’s OMV oil
company, which had been stuck with its share package acquired in 2007. A portion of
the Mol shares held by OMV came from the Rakhimkulov family. The Rakhimkulov
family sold a part of their stakes in Mol to VCP, the company which had an important
role in transactions involving BorsodChem and TVK.VCP in turn passed the shares to
OMV. In October 2007, shortly after the Rakhimkulov–VCP–OMV transactions, the
Hungarian parliament approved the ‘Lex-Mol’ legislation, aimed at preventing a hostile
takeover bid.48 Finally, in March 2009, OMV’s stake in Mol was sold to Surgutneftegaz
for EUR 1.4 billion (USD 1.8 billion), double the market price.49 With its 21.2 percent
stake, Surgutneftegaz emerged as the largest shareholder in Mol. The fact that
Surgutneftegaz picked Mol as the target of its first OFDI is also interesting. The purpose
of the acquisition was unclear, and the ownership structure of Surgutneftegaz has not
been made public either. Mol chairman and CEO Zsolt Hernádi did not describe the
transaction as a hostile takeover (in contrast to OMV’s action), but the Russian company
was only considered a financial investor (HVG.hu, 2009a), and Mol did everything
possible to keep Surgutneftegaz away from exercising its ownership rights,50 prompting
the latter to resell its stake to the Hungarian state. The agreement between the Hungarian
state and Surgutneftegaz to buy back the stake in Mol triggered speculation whether
the transaction was part of a package deal between the Russian and Hungarian
governments.51 Now, it appears that this was not the case.
Due to the failure of Surgutneftegaz, there are no Russian companies with shareholdings
in the Visegrád countries’ refinery industry. In Central and Eastern Europe, three Russian
companies have oil refineries, including those of Lukoil (in Romania and Bulgaria),
Zarubezhneft (in Bosnia’s Serb-dominated Republika Srpska) and Gazprom Neft (in
Serbia).
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48 Lajos Bokros, Hungary’s former finance minister, claimed that that was a brutal attempt by the state to
protect private interests. His remarks were aimed at Hungary’s business oligarchs and the politicians
who receive political donations from such oligarchs (Wagstyl and Thomas, 2007).
49 Those who argue that Surgutneftegaz paid twice the market price for Mol’s shares tend to forget that at
that time the company’s share price was very low.
50 Consequently, Surgutneftegaz launched five lawsuits against Mol (Mol, 2011, p. 157).
51 This allegation was supported by the fact that the sale of shares in Mol can be treated as a special case.
A similar, but not identical, case occurred only in the context of the Slovak gas transporter SPP. The
cases of TVK and BorsodChem in Hungary belonged to a different category. In the case of SPP, Gazprom
did not exercise its option to buy a stake in SPP, and decided to build a bypass pipeline linking Russia
and Germany under the Baltic Sea. Back then, this was known as the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP),
but now it is known as Nord Stream (IEA, 2006, p. 148). Nord Stream Lines 1 and 2 began operating
in November 2011 and October 2012, respectively. The case of Yukos was also different. Acquired in
2002, the main foreign assets of Yukos were the shareholdings in Lithuania’s Mazeikiu Nafta AB oil
company and Slovakia’s oil transporter Transpetrol. The purchase of the 53.7 percent interest in Mazeikiu
Nafta was executed by Yukos in two steps for a total of USD 160 million. Subsequently, Yukos’ stake
was purchased in 2006 by Poland’s PKN Orlen oil company for USD 1.492 billion from the Dutch-
registered Yukos International UK B.V. As for Transpetrol, during a privatisation process Yukos took
over a 49 percent stake in the company for USD 74 million. In 2009, the Slovakian state bought it back
for USD 240 million, also from Yukos International UK B.V.
Gazprom Neft. Natural-resource-seeking Russian FDI has also appeared in Hungary.
Gazprom Neft, Gazprom’s oil arm and Russia’s fourth-largest crude producer, has an
indirect presence in Hungary via Serbia’s NIS oil company, the majority of which is
owned by Gazprom Neft. NIS has taken part in part in exploration projects in Hungary
with the Hungarian subsidiaries of Canadia’s Falcon Oil & Gas (TXM Oil and Gas
Exploration Kft.) and Austria’s Rohöl-Aufsuchungs Aktiengesellschaft or RAG (RAG
Hungary Kft.). Registered in Hungary in 2011, NIS subsidiary Pannon Naftagas Kft.
represents NIS’ interests in Hungary (Gazprom Neft, 2013). In 2014, NIS bought half
of RAG Kiha Kft., a subsidiary of RAG via RAG Hungary Kft., which owns an
exploration licence. NIS and Falcon’s project in exploring for unconventional gas in
the Makó Trough has been unsuccessful. According to the Canadian company, NIS has
not complied with the agreement (Ádám, 2015).
3.5. Banking
In Hungary, there have only been two Russian-owned banks, including, in the past, ÁÉB
(which was first owned by Gazprombank and later by the Rakhimkulov family), and,
now, the subsidiary of Sberbank. ÁÉB passed into Russian ownership through
privatization in 1996, while Sberbank entered the Hungarian market as part of a regional
acquisition in 2012. The Rakhimkulov family’s stake in OTP Bank is also important
to mention. Besides these, Russian bank have only been present in Hungary through
representative offices.
ÁÉB. According to Megdet Rakhimkulov, at that time Gazprom identified Hungary and
Mol as a strategic country and a strategic partner, respectively. Several large-scale
international projects between Russia and Hungary were agreed upon at the governmental
level. Gazprom thus purchased ÁÉB, which, as Rakhimkulov claimed, was practically
teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. But in the end, thus Rakhimkulov, Gazprom’s new
management changed its investment strategy for Hungary and the region and ultimately
lost its interest in ÁÉB (Figyelô, 2004). Gazprombank pulled out of ÁÉB in 2005,
when Kafijat Trading and Consulting Kft. held a 74.48 percent stake in the bank. The
remaining 25.52 percent stake was acquired by Kafijat’s Firthlion Ltd. After that,
commercial banking business was not pursued for long. In March 2007, it was decided
that it would only provide investment services (Hvg.hu, 2007). But already in 2007,
ÁÉB, which was already operating under the name ÁÉB Investment Zrt., merged into
Kafijat (Origó, 2007). ÁÉB was the eighth largest bank in Hungary (New Europe,
2003). At the end of 2005, ÁÉB had a total of only 17 branches (in Budapest and other
Hungarian cities) (Világgazdaság, 2005). Previously, about 70 percent of ÁÉB’s
operations had been devoted to Gazprom and Gazprombank. In 2004, this proportion
accounted for only about 8-10 percent, but a large part of the operations were still
linked to Russian clients. At that time, ÁÉB’s most important Hungarian customers were
BorsodChem Rt., Mol Rt., Matáv Rt. (now Magyar Telekom) and DKG-East Rt. (now
OT Industries–DKG Machine Manufacturing Zrt.). Besides Gazprom and Gazprombank,
significant Russian partners included the MDM Group, Zenit Bank and the Nikoil
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financial group (currently Uralsib). ÁÉB served more than 30,000 clients, 70 percent
of which were households, while 30 percent were corporate (Simon and Szép, 2004).
ÁÉB branches were taken over by Hungarian Volksbank Zrt., which was a subsidiary
of the Austrian Volksbank.
Sberbank. In 2012, Sberbank, which is Russia’s largest lender and is controlled by the
CBR, became the owner of Volksbank International AG (though the transaction did not
include the Romanian subsidiary). With this deal, Sberbank expanded beyond the former
Soviet Union. There is a trace of historical continuity apparent in the fact that some of
these Hungarian branches were previously owned by ÁÉB. According to the press,
Hungary’s OTP Bank was also interested in acquiring the Volksbank company. Sberbank
operates 43 branches in Hungary (including 16 in Budapest), but has not reached a share
of 5 percent in most segments. The aim is to ensure that as a universal bank, Sberbank
will have a market share of more than 5 percent in all important segments of Hungarian
banking by 2018 (Palkó, 2014). Once again, this marks an area where an investment
in a specific sector was driven by the desire to find new markets. The primary objective
of Sberbank’s Hungarian subsidiary, Sberbank Hungary Zrt., is to provide comprehensive
services to Russian private and corporate clients, and to enhance trade between the Central
and East European countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Sberbank,
n.a.). However, the Hungarian subsidiary has not proved to be a successful investment
for Sberbank. Though the company’s losses diminished year after year, press reports
suggest that Moscow leaders were not altogether satisfied with the prevailing state of
affairs at the bank. Lawsuits related to loans denominated in foreign currencies have
also caused significant losses resulting from measures taken by Sberbank Hungary’s
predecessor (Szakonyi, 2015). Currently, the Hungarian banking industry is facing legal
obligations to issue loanholders refunds in the context of loans denominated in foreign
currencies, which were very popular before the economic crisis, but have proved a
burden since exchange rates have depreciated markedly.52 In 2014, the media suggested
that Sberbank would withdraw from Hungary, but the bank denied that allegation (Reidl,
2014). In February 2015, the media learned that the Hungarian government would buy
Sberbank’s Hungarian branches (Szakonyi, 2015). Also, in February 2015, a Czech
newspaper said that Sberbank was preparing to sell its Slovak and Hungarian operations
(Reuters, 2015).
Representative offices of Russian banks. There are currently two Russian banks that are
operating representative offices in Hungary, including Baltiyskiy Bank (since 1994) and
Vneshekonombank (State Corporation “Bank for Development and Foreign Economic
Affairs” or VEB) (since 2001). Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank closed its representative office
in 2008.
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52 Refund obligations concern unfair unilateral contract changes and exchange-rate margins (Gergely et
al., 2014).
– In 1995, Baltiyskiy Bank was on the verge of buying the Hungarian–Israeli Leumi
Credit Bank, but ultimately this transaction was never concluded (Magyar Hírlap, 1995).
Baltiyskiy Bank was founded in St. Petersburg in 1989, and, as a result of a bailout,
it has belonged to Russia’s largest private bank, Alfa Bank, since 2014.
– State-owned VEB will play a special role in Hungary. The extension of the nuclear
power plant near Paks, located some 100 kilometres south of Budapest in Central
Hungary, is not an FDI issue and is highly controversial. According to the
intergovernmental agreement signed in January 2014, Russia’s Rosatom State Atomic
Energy Corporation will expand the Hungarian power plant. According to the loan
agreement of April 2014, the Russians will provide an intergovernmental loan of up
to EUR 10 billion to Hungary for the design, construction and commission of the future
fifth and sixth blocks. VEB will act as an agent for the Russian government.
– The privately-owned Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank had a representative office in Budapest
between 1997 and 1999, and another in Gyôr, in the Western part of Hungary, between
1997 and 2008. Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank played a significant role in granting loans
for the export of Hungarian Ikarus buses to Russia and in organizing syndicated loans.
Among the abovementioned Russian banks, Gazprombank, Sberbank and Vneshe-
konombank were targets of sanctions imposed by the EU and the US.
3.6. Metallurgy
There is a strong indirect Russian presence in Hungarian metallurgy. For a long time,
there had been no Russian metallurgical interest in Hungary, which was once obsessed
with the notion of being the country of iron and steel. In the 2000s, Russian metallurgical
companies were paying considerable attention to acquisition opportunities in Hungary,
but no results were reported.
– At the end of 2003, Russia’s Severstal steel and mining company lost the tender for
the privatisation of Dunaferr Danube Ironworks Rt. in Dunaújváros (situated some
70 kilometres south from Budapest). Severstal was focusing on the American Rouge
Steel Company, which was more important to the Russian company because acquiring
American Rouge Steel allowed it to become a steel supplier for US auto industry
multinationals (Fn24, 2003). The consortium of (1) Ukraine’s Industrial Union of
Donbass (ISD), (2) Ukraine’s ISD-controlled Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant, (3) the
Swiss Duferco International Trading Holding Ltd. and (4) the Liechtenstein-registered
Kundax AG won the tender (Dunaferr, 2003), but, in fact, Dunaferr was first taken
over by Kundax AG, a project company set up by ISD (and Alchevsk Metallurgical
Plant) and Duferco to handle acquisitions. Subsequently, in 2007, the stake was
eventually turned over to the Cyprus-based Steelhold Ltd. (GVH, 2004a, 2004b;
Dunaferr, 2007).53 The change occurred in late 2009, when Russian investors obtained
a stake of 50 percent plus two shares in the metallurgical assets of ISD (Olearchyk,
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53 These transactions clearly show the limitations of official statistical recording.
2010; Rusmergers.com, 2010).54 As a result of this deal, Russian investors ultimately
became involved in the metallurgical industry in the cities of Dunaújváros and Diósgyôr
(the latter is part of the Northern Hungarian city of Miskolc). Various media sources
mention Russian Vneshekonombank as the largest owner of ISD and ISD Dunaferr
Danube Ironworks Zrt. (Dunaferr magazin, 2013; Ábrahám, 2013).55 But in the official
documents VEB only notes that it has helped a number of Russian investors to
purchase ISD and that it supports Russian investors that had purchased ISD in the
past (VEB, 2013a, 2013b). A Ukrainian source said in 2012 that the owners were still
unknown, and that top managers from VEB were only placed into leading positions
at ISD and its subsidiaries in 2011 (Troshina, 2012). The Hungarian economic weekly
HVG wrote in August 2014 that Steelhold’s stake was transferred from
Vneshekonombank to the 60 percent Russian state-owned VTB Bank (Csabai and Vitéz,
2014). Sanctions imposed by the EU and the US are affecting both Vneshekonombank
and VTB Bank. Due to the permanent crisis of Hungarian iron and steel, ISD’s
engagement seems to carry high risks. It was announced in 2013 that as part of a cost
optimisation program, ISD Dunaferr was looking to cut staff by 1,500. Reacting to
this news, the Hungarian government offered to buy ISD Dunaferr from VEB, but
the offer was refused. At the time of the takeover, ISD presumably needed Dunaferr
because of Hungary’s rolling mill capacity and the access to the EU market. But the
EU market has been losing its significance.56
– In Diósgyôr, there had been no production since December 2008. The metallurgy in
Diósgyôr moved from one liquidation to another. Back in the 1980s, 16,000 people
had been working at the plant, while in 1991 this figure fell to 11,000 and dropped
to only 1,500 in 2002. When production ceased in spring 2004, 1,200 workplaces were
made redundant (Origó, 2004). Despite expressing its interest in April 2004, Evraz,
Russia’s steel holding, did not want to acquire ownership of the respective company
in Diósgyôr, which is called DAM Steel Rt. In 2004, DAM Steel’s assets were
transferred to Dunaferr’s beneficiary, Európahíd 2003 Kft., which had been established
by Ukrainian and Hungarian individuals but belonged to Dunaferr/ISD. Still, in 2004
Európahíd 2003 changed its name to DAM 2004 Kft. In 2006, DAM 2004 was taken
over by a company (Reeferway Ltd.) listed in the British Virgin Islands, which is
affiliated with ISD. However, in 2009 DAM 2004 was once again under liquidation.
In 2010, the liquidator sold the assets of Diósgyôr metallurgy to Öko-Ferr Kft., which
belongs to ISD Dunaferr’s ISD Power Kft. Several investors have expressed interest
in DAM’s assets since then, but none of these declarations of interests has progressed
into the contract preparation phase (Leszák, 2012).
– Mechel Service Hungary Kft., an affiliate of the Russian mining and metals company
Mechel, has decided to limit its local engagement to selling Mechel’s steel products
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54 According to an ISD statement, one of its new owners is Swiss-based steel trader Carbofer, which is
itself co-owned by Russian businessman Alexander Katunin (Olearchyk, 2010).
55 Another Hungarian source mentions VEB as a company that comprises the Russian owners of ISD Dunaferr
(Hvg.hu, 2014).
56 Interviews with András Deák and Zoltán Borbély by Vs.hu (Lebhardt, 2014).
to Hungarian customers. Mechel Service Hungary was registered in 2010 with
headquarters in Budapest and a share capital of only HUF 500,000. Mechel is controlled
by its chairman of the board of directors, Igor Zyuzin. Mechel Service Hungary is
owned by Mechel through the Dutch-based Mechel Service Global B.V., a subsidiary
founded in 2009 which specialises in selling Mechel’s rolled products.
3.7. Machinery
There have been a few Russian capital-related projects in Hungary’s machinery worth
mentioning.
1. In 2008, Ganz Machinery Works Holding Zrt. started a joint venture with its Russian
state-owned partner Transportno-Tekhnologicheskoye Mashinostroyeniye (TTM),
which is owned by Atomenergomash. The company created by the two partners is called
Ganz Engineering and Energetics Machinery Kft. In 2010, TTM was replaced by
Tsentralnoye Konstruktorskoye Byuro Mashinostroyeniya (TsKBM). TsKBM is also
owned by Atomenergomash, which is owned by Atomenergoprom, an affiliate of
Rosatom. TsKBM is a 51 percent owner of the joint venture. Ganz Engineering and
Energetics Machinery is involved, among other things, in the manufacture and
installation of hydromachines, nuclear power station machinery and oil drilling
equipment. The company has unique knowledge and experience in Central Europe in
planning and manufacturing small-series products. Its high-capacity power plant
pumps are also in demand in the Russian and Ukrainian nuclear industry (Ganz, n.a.).
2. A Russian group (Concern Tractor Plants/Agromash Holding B.V.57) took over
Austria’s Vogel & Noot in 2009, including its two Hungarian agricultural machinery
factories. One of them (Vogel & Noot Mezôgépgyár Kft.) produces ploughs in the
city of Mosonmagyaróvár, close to Austria and Slovakia; the other one (Vogel & Noot
Talajtechnika Kft.), located in the city of Törökszentmiklós in Central Hungary,
produces cultivators, compact disc harrows, subsoilers, packer and rollers. Production
in Mosonmagyaróvár began in 1993, while in Törökszentmiklós it started in 2008.
3. Established in 1990, Uraltrak Kft. (formerly called Mátracselex Kft.) is the only
official Hungarian dealer of Russia’s Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant–Uraltrak; its site is
located in a village northeast of Budapest.58 Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant is involved
in the engineering and production of industrial tractors and engines (Uraltrak, n.a.).
Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant is owned by the Russian state-owned tank and railway car
manufacturer Uralvagonzavod.
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57 Concern Tractor Plants (CTP), the previous parent company, is now part of Machinery & Industrial Group
N.V. (M&IG; initially it was operating under the name of Concern Tractor Plants N.V.), which is registered
in the Netherlands and has become the holding company for the former. However, the group is managed
by CTP, which has its headquarters in Russia. The Dutch-registered Agromash Holding B.V. also belongs
to M&IG. M&IG is a leading manufacturer of earthmoving machinery. In 2010, through a debt
restructuring, Vneshekonombank acquired 100 percent of M&IG shares but did not obtain control over
the company. Most of the shares had been held by Mikhail Bolotin.
58 Gábor Reppa drew our attention to this company.
4. After its privatisation in 1993, for a long time the Russians continuously held shares
in DKG-East Oil and Gas Equipment Manufacturing Zrt. (and its predecessors), a
manufacturer of equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemical industries. It was only
a long time after 1993 that Russian ownership interest in the company, which is now
called OT Industries–DKG Machine Manufacturing Zrt., ceased. Meanwhile, not
only have the owners of the company changed but so have the target markets of its
products. Various companies with Russian interests, including Gazprom and
Interprokom, ÁÉB, Firthlion, Saturley Holdings Ltd. and Invest-Bond, were also
among its owners (Csabai, 2007). As far as individual owners are concerned, Megdet
Rakhimkulov is also among the previous owners (HVG, 2006).
3.8. Logistics and transportation
Hungary’s non-energy/utility and non-telecom infrastructure-related industries have
also been at the forefront of Russian investors’ interest, though on the whole their
investment efforts have not been successful thus far.
– Magnit, Russia’s largest grocery retailer by revenue and number of stores, announced
its plans for Eastern Hungary in December 2013.59 Finally, despite the crisis in
Ukraine, it seemed in May 2014 that the project to build a logistics centre and a
transport department with a fleet of 1,000 trucks in Eastern Hungary was greenlighted;
it would have created over 2,000 jobs.60 But in August 2014 the project was put on
hold, probably due to the war situation in Ukraine and the Russian embargo. Investment
plans had raised serious concerns among Hungarian carriers who had predicted the
losses of thousands of jobs in Hungary. The company would employ Hungarian
drivers who would drive vehicles with Hungarian license plates. Hungary’s geographic
location and the agricultural base might have played a role in the investment decision.
A great advantage of the Záhony area in Northeastern Hungary at the Hunga-
rian–Ukrainian border is that it has broad-gauge lines. Poland was also in competition
for the logistics centre. Trucks carrying products to Magnit from Western Europe are
currently going to Russia via Belarus. Part of the food supplies would come from
Hungary, which is not a novelty, since in 2012 and 2013 Magnit had bought food
products from Hungary in the value of EUR 12 million (HUF 3.6 billion) (Origó, 2014;
Szakonyi, 2014). Some of the Magnit owners and managers were already present in
the Hungarian market, through their involvement in two vineyard and winery companies
(Monte Tokaj Kft. and Winexport Kft.) (Batka, 2014; Hvg.hu, 2015c).
– The issue of Záhony has always been at the forefront of Russo–Hungarian relations,
but thus far it has proved a failure. Záhony is in competition with Slovakia and Poland.
Registered in 2003, Transzkontinentális Logisztika Hungary Rt. aimed at setting up
and operating an international warehouse and logistics centre in Záhony (Menedzsment
Fórum, 2004). But after its liquidation (which began in 2006), the company was
struck from the register in 2008.
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59 Sergei Galitsky is the founder and largest shareholder of Magnit.
60 In December 2013, 1,500 new jobs were mentioned as a possibility (Hvg.hu, 2013).
– On top of these initiatives, both Slovakia and Hungary raised the idea of building a
broad-gauge railway through their countries, but no progress has been made.
– The history of Malév Hungarian Airlines Zrt. is another story of failure. Malév was
under Russian control for three years.61 Owned by Boris Abramovich, Magdolna Költô
and Kálmán Kiss, AirBridge Zrt. became the 99.95 percent owner of Malév in April
2007. The Russian partner had promised funding and passengers. The basic concept
was to bring passengers headed from Asia to Europe to Budapest, and transferring them
to flights operated by Malév which would bring them to their European destinations.
But at the end of the day, the privatization commitment was not met, and the restructuring
of Malév failed to even commence (Gépnarancs, 2012). After the bankruptcy of
companies belonging to the Russian airline alliance AiRUnion, controlled by the
Abramovich brothers, Boris Abramovich’s 49.5 percent stake was taken over by
Vneshekonombank in 2009 (while as a result of taking over Kálmán Kiss’s stake,
Magdolna Költô’s stake in AirBridge increased to 50.5 percent, i.e. Malév always
remained “Hungarian airlines”). Malév was renationalised in 2010 and finally went
bankrupt in 2012. However, VEB still holds a claim to roughly EUR 110 million, and
Russia continues to insist on the repayment of this debt (Hvg.hu, 2015a; Fóti, 2015).
3.9. Real estate and Russians living in Hungary
The presence of Russian players in Hungary’s real estate market is a visible phenomenon,
though according to the Moscow-based real estate agency Gordon Rock, Hungary is
not among the top 15 destinations for residential real estate purchases by Russians.
Rankings for 2008, 2009 and 2010 show that the main target market was Bulgaria. Three
other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Montenegro (No. 3), the Czech Republic
(No. 5) and Latvia (No. 7), were on the 2010 list. In 2009, Latvia was not yet among
the top 15 destinations (Gordon Rock, 2010; Metrosfera, n.a.).
In 2013, Russian citizens claimed first place among non-EU foreigners buying residential
real estate in Hungary. EU citizens, by contrast, are no longer obligated to obtain
permits. The five-year period of derogation, which had allowed Hungary to impose such
a requirement on EU citizens, ended on 1 May 2009. In 2013, 1,365 foreigners, including
510 Russians, 165 Chinese and 109 Ukrainians, were granted permits to acquire a total
of 1,267 real estates. Among permits issued to Russians in 2013, Zala County in the
country westernmost region was the most attractive destination (with 283 permits),
followed by Budapest (132). Data for the period between 2007 and 2013 show the
growing number of Russian residential real estate owners in Zala County, with special
attention to the spa city of Hévíz (Ingatlanmenedzser.hu, 2009; Világgazdaság, 2009;
Pénzcentrum, 2011; Napi.hu, 2014).
In early May 2015, it was announced that the only five-star hotel in Hévíz, the 232-
room Lotus Therme Hotel & Spa, had passed into Russian ownership. The operator of
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61 However, Malév’s predecessor was the Hungarian–Soviet Maszovlet Rt., which was set up in 1946.
the hotel remained the same, however. Incorporated in April 2015 and headquartered
in Budapest, the new owner is AEG Ingatlanhasznosító Zrt., which is represented by
three Russian individuals but is owned by the Cottian Property Ltd. registered in Cyprus.
One of the persons authorised to represent AEG Ingatlanhasznosító is Alexandr Baranov,
a co-owner of 1000 Út Kft., a leading inbound travel agency, which was registered in
Hungary in 2001 (Szalma Baksi, 2015).
An example for the presence of Russians in Hungarian spa areas is a thermal bath in
the city of Nagybajom in Somogy County, which was acquired by Timax Kft. in 2008.
The latter was founded in 1997 and is owned by two individuals. It is also a story of
failure. News reports in January 2012 said that the planned investment would not
materialise (F. Szarka, 2008, 2012; Körtési, 2012). The thermal bath and the land plot
went up for sale.
Hungary is interesting for Russian tourists primarily because of medical tourism.
Reportedly, some 70 percent of Russian tourists participate in organized trips. However,
the number of Russian tourists arriving in Hungary may fall in 2015 due to the
Russian–Ukrainian conflict and the Russian ruble crisis (Napi Gazdaság Online, 2015).
Central Statistical Office (KSH), the number of Russian citizens residing in Hungary
at the beginning of 2014 was only 3,657 (Table 14; KSH, 2014). The editor-in-chief of
Hungary’s Russian-language newspaper Rossiyskiy Kurier claims that the real number
is well above 20,000, while the number of Russian-speaking people living in Hungary
is between 50,000 and 100,000 (Bendarzsevszkij, 2011). According to the Hungarian
census of 2011, 13,337 persons had indicated that they are Russian, which marked an
increase over the figure of 5,512 in 2001 (KSH, n.a.). Recently, many Russians became
Hungarian citizens by abusing the system for obtaining Hungarian citizenship through
the simplified naturalisation process (Szalai, 2015). Regarding the Hungarian residence
permit bonds, media sources in Hungary argue that Chinese are by far the greatest
buyers (Bors, 2015).
Gábor Reppa, a Hungarian expert, told the author that in his experience, the creation
of a large number of small and medium-sized companies with Russian capital was, in
large part, a result of the fact that it was much simpler for an executive officer/owner
of an operating company to obtain a visa for an extended state (type “D”). Moreover,
if the company did actual business, then they could request a residence permit. This
aspect has been more prevalent since the introduction of the Schengen visa.62 Before
entering the EU in 2004, Hungary imposed visa requirements on Russian citizens in
June 2001, while Poland, by contrast, waited until the last minute to introduce a visa
regime (it was done with effect from October 2003).
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62 Personal communication, 5 June 2013. However, he now believes that the process described above is
not that active, though it does exist (personal communication, 11 May 2015).
3.10. Other industries and companies
In addition to the industries analysed here, Russian companies operate in a wide variety
of industries in Hungary. Two examples are as follows:
– The result of Russo–Hungarian cooperation in nanotechnology is the establishment
of the company Nanovo Kft. The joint venture was created by two Russian private
companies and Hungary’s Miskolc Holding Municipality Asset Management
Corporation Zrt. in Miskolc in 2007. In 2009, the latter sold its 50 percent stake to a
private company, Lenbiz Kft., based in the Hungarian city of Szeged in Southern
Hungary.63 The headquarters of Nanovo also moved from Miskolc to Szeged. The
company’s share capital was reduced to only HUF 500,000, down from HUF 50
million previously. The successful and well-known project of Nanovo is linked to
Eurotex Kft., a textile company with a site in the city of Hódmez?vásárhely in South-
East Hungary, whose products are treated with colloidal silver.
– Another relatively widely known Russian-owned company is LIT Budapest Kft.
Incorporated in 2006, LIT Budapest deals with disinfection technologies, including
the use of UV in the treatment of drinking water, wastewater, technological water and
water for swimming pools and spas. The company’s main activities include the sale
and installation of equipment, maintenance and servicing (LIT Budapest, n.a.). Founded
in 1991, LIT is a among the world’s top three developers and manufacturers of UV
systems for water, air and surface disinfection (LIT, n.a.).
4. Summary and conclusions
Russian FDI in Hungary attracted most attention at the turn of the century (due to the
acquisitions of shares in BorsodChem and TVK by Gazprom) and at the beginning of
the 2010s (due to the acquisition of shares in Mol by Surgutneftegaz). In both cases,
Russian attempts ultimately proved to unsuccessful, and thus became examples of
legitimate fears of Russian capital.
As it was limited to the end of both 2009 and 2010, Hungary’s leading position – in
statistical terms – in Central and Eastern Europe in terms of attracting Russian FDI proved
to be temporary, and was only due to the Surgutneftegaz deal. Statistics offer limited
help in getting a real picture of Russian FDI in Hungary. In many cases, indirect FDI
was observed. Consequently, the size and variety of Russian presence can only be
estimated by analysing company and media sources in meticulous detail. But although
the presence of Russian investors in Hungary is more significant than official statistics
indicate, the overall picture does not change much. Not only do the official statistics
say that Russian FDI plays a limited role in Hungary, but company data also suggest
this. Our research shows that among the top 20 non-financial Russian MNEs, only a
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63 Currently based in Békéscsaba, a city in Southeast Hungary, Lenbiz Kft. is under liquidation.
few companies are active investors in Hungary. Several large Russian companies are
being targeted by the EU and US sanctions.
We have found that the motivations behind Russian FDI in Hungary are complex.
Among other things, natural-resource-seeking FDI also appeared, such as in the case
of Serbia’s Russian-controlled NIS, which is performing hydrocarbon exploration.
Russian oil and gas companies aim at controlling the entire value chain from production
to the end user (i.e. to vertically integrate their businesses), but the EU’s Third Energy
Package works in ways that runs counter to such expectations.
Company data and our case studies demonstrate that the activities of Russian investors
in Hungary analysed here were paved with failures. These have been evident in both
divestments and unrealised plans. Kalotay et al. (2014) suggest that a low share of
Russian investment in the Visegrád countries may be referred to as business opportunities
that the Russian parties failed to exploit. Our case studies confirm this assumption in
the case of Hungary.
In recent years, the investment climate in Hungary has been unfavourable. It is clear
that the controversial “crisis tax” has negatively affected Russian players. However, the
so-called “Robin Hood” tax is still a (now larger) burden on energy firms. And a new
tax on public utility pipelines and cables was also introduced.
When the issue of the Surgutneftegaz deal was finally concluded, this meant that
Russo–Hungarian relations were relieved of a serious burden. In fact, ultimately the deal
did not turn out to be disadvantageous for Surgutneftegaz: they bought the stake for
EUR 1.4 billion and sold it for EUR 1.88 billion. Nonetheless, the case left its mark on
Russian high politics (at least for a while). Not only did Vladimir Putin publicly discuss
the transaction in November 2010 (Origo, 2010), but he also wrote about it in one of
his articles published before the presidential election of February 2012. However, at
that time, he only referred to the case without mentioning names (i.e. he wrote about
Russians being deprived of their ownership rights), concluding that it was necessary to
strengthen the economic and political support of Russian companies in foreign markets
(Putin, 201264). The latter is not a new idea. Nor is it a novel idea, however, that impro-
ving transparency would certainly reduce fears of Russian investment; and, incidentally,
such apprehensions are not limited to Central and Eastern Europe.
As for future Russian investments, FDI projects that are similar in scope to the
Surgutneftegaz deal are not likely in Hungary in the near future. However, some
investments are still on the horizon, though they are accompanied by uncertainty. The
largest project involving OFDI, but also other types of transactions, could have been
the construction of the Hungarian section of South Stream. Another significant FDI project
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64 Nyilas (2012) drew our attention to this article.
whose future is unclear is that of Magnit. Finally, the extension of the nuclear power
plant near Paks is not an FDI project, but it is economically very significant.
Efforts to monitor and track Russian FDI remain an important task, particularly because
of the sensitivity of the issue under the current geopolitical circumstances.
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Tables
Table 1. The top 20 Russian non-financial multinational enterprises, by foreign assets, end of year, 
2011 (Millions of dollars)
Source: Kuznetsov (2013).
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Rank Name
One or two main industries
Status
Foreign
(% of state ownership) assets
1 Lukoil Oil & gas extraction / refineries Listed 29,159
2 Gazprom Oil & gas extraction / gas distribution Listed (State – 50.002%) 21,767
3 Evraz Iron & steel / mining of metal ores Listed (only abroad) 8,210
and coals
4 Mechel Iron & steel / mining of metal ores Listed 6,365
and coals
5 Sovcomflot Sea transport Unlisted (State – 100%) 5,838
6 Sistema Conglomerate Listed 5,207
7 Severstal Iron & steel / mining of metal ores Listed 5,194
and coals
8 UC RUSAL Non-ferrous metals / mining of Listed 4,611
metal ores
9 NLMK Iron & steel / mining of metal ores Listed 4,226
10 Atomredmetzoloto Mining of uranium ores Unlisted (State – 100%) 3,731
11 TNK-BP Oil & gas extraction / refineries Listed 2,940
12 TMK Metal tubes Listed 2,394
13 MMK Iron & steel / mining of metal ores Listed 2,101
and coals
14 Norilsk Nickel Non-ferrous metals / mining of Listed 1,968
metal ores
15 Zarubezhneft Oil extraction / refineries Unlisted (State – 100%) 1,834
16 NordGold Mining of gold ores Listed (only abroad) 1,695
17 Inter RAO UES Electricity production and supply Listed (State – 60.2%) 1,433
18 Rosneft Oil & gas extraction / refineries Listed (State – 75.2%) 1,045
19 FESCO Sea and railway transportation Listed 747
20 Acron Agrochemicals Listed 721
Total 111,186
Table 2. Russian FDI stock in the CEE countries,a according to data provided by the Central Bank 
of Russia, end of year, 2009–2013 (Millions of dollars)
a Excluding the CIS and Georgia.
b In descending order.
Source: Own compilation based on CBR (2014). 
Table 3. Russian FDI flows to the CEE countries,a according to data provided by the Central Bank 
of Hungary, net, 2007 – Q3 2014 (Millions of dollars)
a Excluding the CIS and Georgia.
Source: Own compilation based on CBR (2015b).
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Rankb
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value Country Value
1 Hungary 2,266 Hungary 2,230 Bulgaria 2,439 Bulgaria 2,854 Latvia 3,062
2 Bulgaria 1,586 Bulgaria 1,884 Serbia 1,488 Serbia 1,784 Bulgaria 2,870
3 Lithuania 1,380 Lithuania 1,420 Lithuania 1,444 Czech Rep. 1,598 Czech Rep. 1,842
4 Montenegro 1,339 Czech Rep. 1,192 Czech Rep. 1,309 Lithuania 1,335 Serbia 1,788
5 Czech Rep. 1,336 Montenegro 896 Montenegro 935 Montenegro 1,109 Lithuania 1,411
6 Poland 596 Bosnia & H. 678 Latvia 704 Latvia 941 Montenegro 1,232
7 Estonia 589 Serbia 623 Bosnia & H. 561 Bosnia & H. 725 Bosnia & H. 877
8 Bosnia & H. 541 Poland 581 Poland 545 Poland 589 Poland 618
9 Latvia 535 Latvia 473 Croatia 250 Croatia 355 Estonia 412
10 Serbia 394 Romania 258 Hungary 228 Estonia 276 Croatia 399
11 Croatia 206 Croatia 226 Estonia 220 Romania 138 Hungary 316
12 Romania 63 Estonia 149 Romania 147 Hungary 107 Slovakia 117
13 Slovakia 48 Slovenia 59 Slovenia 64 Slovakia 78 Slovenia 72
14 Slovenia 14 Slovakia 52 Slovakia 59 Slovenia 45 Romania 36
15 Albania – Albania – Albania – Macedonia 1 Albania 2
16 Macedonia – Macedonia – Macedonia – Albania 1 Macedonia 1
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Q1–Q3 2014
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 55 287 94 104 149 78 121
Bulgaria 125 441 261 319 522 716 554 244
Croatia 95 75 13 23 103 31 71 65
Czech Republic 248 319 142 360 337 265 340 303
Estonia 13 29 11 21 30 85 130 100
Hungary 51 542 1,789 48 -2,724 67 155 43
Latvia 79 166 78 147 328 348 568 402
Lithuania 57 57 64 49 66 28 46 -95
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 3
Montenegro 188 173 85 117 160 185 173 141
Poland 28 -50 13 -2 30 -2 73 17
Romania 1 25 39 196 -96 -1 -101 1
Serbia 44 11 609 208 372 63 -39 -32
Slovakia 13 29 7 11 19 49 32 18

























2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Excluding SPEs
Total NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -210.3 1,128.5 1,516.9 -70.2 -96.4
Equity capital and reinvested earnings 64.1 67.7 74.1 94.7 -5.2 17.1 697.3 24.7 1,396.8 1,660.4 19.9 26.7
Other capital NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -235.0 -268.3 -143.5 -90.1 -123.0
Including SPEs
Total NA NA NA NA NA 19.4 699.8 -447.8 1,130.0 1,514.4 -74.7 -102.1
Equity capital and reinvested earnings NA NA NA NA NA 19.4 699.8 26.3 1,398.3 1,662.0 19.6 28.6
Other capital NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -474.1 -268.3 -147.6 -94.2 -130.7
Table 4. Russian FDI stock in Hungary, according to data provided by the Central Bank of Hungary, 
BPM5 methodology,a end of year, 2001–2012 (Millions of euros)
NA – Not available.
a See MNB (2014g).
Source: Own compilation based on MNB (2014a, 2014b).
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Excluding SPEs
Total NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -210.3 1,128.5 1,516.9 -70.2 -95.9 -57.4
Equity 64.1 67.7 74.1 94.7 -5.2 17.1 697.3 24.7 1,396.8 1,660.4 19.9 26.7 35.6
Debt instruments NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -235.0 -268.3 -143.5 -90.1 -122.5 -92.9
Including SPEs
Total NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -447.8 1,130.0 1,514.4 -74.7 -101.7 -71.3
Equity NA NA NA NA NA 19.4 699.8 26.3 1,398.3 1,662.0 19.6 28.6 37.5
Debt instruments NA NA NA NA NA NA NA -474.1 -268.3 -147.6 -94.2 -130.2 -108.8
Table 5. Russian FDI stock in Hungary, according to data provided by the Central Bank 
of Hungary, BPM6 methodology,a end of year, 2001–2013 (Millions of euros)
NA – Not available.a See MNB (2014h).















Total Excluding Between 
Total Assets Liabilities
fellows fellowb Excluding Between Excluding Between 
fellows fellowsb fellows fellowsb
Excluding SPEs
2008 -210.3 24.7 24.7 0.0 -235.0 0.0 241.2 0.0 6.3
2009 1,128.5 1,396.8 1,396.8 0.0 -268.3 0.0 274.1 0.0 5.9
2010 1,516.9 1,660.4 1,660.4 0.0 -143.5 0.0 155.4 1.5 10.5
2011 -70.2 19.9 19.9 0.0 -90.1 0.0 108.0 5.0 12.9
2012 -95.9 26.7 26.7 0.0 -122.5 8.0 131.7 0.0 17.1
2013 -57.4 35.6 37.3 -1.7 -92.9 0.0 101.7 5.6 3.1
Including SPEs
2008 -447.8 26.3 26.3 0.0 -474.1 0.0 480.3 0.0 6.3
2009 1,130.0 1,398.3 1,398.3 0.0 -268.3 0.0 274.1 0.0 5.9
2010 1,514.4 1,662.0 1,662.0 0.0 -147.6 0.0 160.1 1.5 11.1
2011 -74.7 19.6 19.6 0.0 -94.2 0.0 112.7 5.0 13.5
2012 -101.7 28.6 28.6 0.0 -130.2 8.0 140.0 0.0 17.7
2013 -71.3 37.5 39.2 -1.7 -108.8 0.0 118.1 5.6 3.7
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013








instruments instruments Instruments instruments
2,266 2,266 – 2,230 2,192 39 228 228 – 106 65 41 316 253 63
Table 7. Russian FDI stock in Hungary, according to the Central Bank of Russia, end of year, 2009–2013 (Millions of dollars) 
Source: CBR (2014).
Table 6. Russian FDI stock in Hungary, according to data provided by the Central Bank 
of Hungary, BPM6 methodology,a detailed breakdown, end of year, 2008–2013 (Millions of euros)
a See MNB (2014h).
b Ultimate controlling parent is non-resident.

























2007 2008 2009 2010
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Excluding SPEs
Total, net -5.5 -7.7 -53.9 -7.8 -47.3 -664.3 -69.8 34.0 24.0 778.9 0.3 98.1 74.0 140.5 -55.3 110.7
Credit -4.0 -5.6 -8.2 -7.7 34.0 74.2 46.0 54.4 86.1 879.5 66.5 127.6 116.2 183.5 72.2 137.6
Debit 1.5 2.1 45.8 0.1 81.2 738.6 115.8 20.4 62.1 100.6 66.3 29.5 42.2 43.0 127.5 26.9
Equity, net 0.2 0.5 -0.2 0.7 0.00 -677.4 0.00 5.8 -4.3 789.7 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Credit 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.8 0.00 789.8 0.00 0.00 0.3 0.3 5.8 0.3
Debit 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.00 0.00 677.4 0.00 0.00 4.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.00 0.00 5.5 0.00
Other capital, net 2.1 2.1 -45.4 0.1 -48.9 12.5 -71.7 26.5 29.4 -45.4 -40.4 57.5 45.1 112.2 -84.1 80.2
Credit 3.0 2.1 0.1 0.2 32.4 72.5 44.1 46.8 87.2 51.0 25.8 86.9 87.3 153.5 37.9 107.1
Debit 0.9 0.1 45.5 0.1 81.2 60.0 115.8 20.4 57.8 96.4 66.1 29.4 42.2 41.3 122.0 26.9
Including SPEs
Total, net -16.1 7.8 -77.4 -19.0 -66.9 -681.8 -96.8 17.6 287.6 778.9 0.3 98.1 76.9 138.8 -55.6 111.0
Credit -4.0 22.2 -8.2 -7.7 34.0 74.3 46.0 56.4 361.1 879.5 66.5 127.6 119.1 183.5 72.2 138.0
Debit 12.1 14.3 69.2 11.3 100.9 756.1 142.8 38.8 73.5 100.6 66.3 29.5 42.2 44.8 127.8 27.0
Equity, net 0.2 27.7 -0.2 0.5 0.00 -677.4 0.00 5.8 -4.3 789.7 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Credit 0.3 27.8 0.1 0.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.8 0.0 789.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 5.8 0.3
Debit 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.00 677.4 0.00 0.00 4.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.00 0.00 5.5 0.00
Other capital, net -8.6 -9.6 -68.9 -10.9 -68.6 -5.0 -98.7 10.0 292.9 -45.4 -40.4 57.5 48.0 110.5 -84.4 80.5
Credit 3.0 2.7 0.1 0.2 32.4 72.5 44.1 48.8 362.1 51.0 25.8 86.9 90.2 153.5 37.9 107.5
Debit 11.6 12.3 69.0 11.1 100.9 77.5 142.8 38.8 69.2 96.4 66.1 29.4 42.2 43.0 122.3 27.0
Table 8. Russian FDI flows into Hungary, according to the Central Bank of Hungary, 
BPM5 methodology,a quarterly data, 2007–2012 (Millions of euros)
(Table continued)
Table 8 (continued). Russian FDI flows into Hungary, according to data provided by the Central Bank of
Hungary, BPM5 methodology,a quarterly data, 2007–2012 (Millions of euros)
NA – Not available.a See MNB (2014g).
Source: Own compilation based on MNB (2014e, 2014f).
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2011 2012 2013s
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Excluding SPEs
Total, net -10.1 61.1 -1,848.6 -3.9 4.8 -4.7 -35.1 11.1 NA NA NA NA
Credit 50.2 119.6 41.3 32.3 39.7 34.8 26.2 41.5 NA NA NA NA
Debit 60.3 58.6 1,890.0 36.3 34.8 39.5 61.3 30.4 48.1 41.7 57.4 51.6
Equity, net 1.3 1.2 -1,860.8 1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.4 0.00 6.3
Credit 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.4 0.00 6.3
Debit 0.00 0.00 1,862.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other capital, net -13.7 57.2 9.6 -7.7 3.5 -6.1 -36.6 9.5 -19.3 21.0 -24.9 28.4
Credit 46.6 115.8 37.5 28.6 38.4 33.4 24.7 39.9 28.8 55.4 32.5 80.0
Debit 60.3 58.6 27.9 36.3 34.8 39.5 61.3 30.4 48.1 34.4 57.4 51.6
Including SPEs
Total, net -10.1 61.0 -1,848.6 -3.9 4.9 -4.7 -37.6 10.2 NA NA NA NA
Credit 50.3 119.6 41.3 32.7 39.7 34.8 26.2 41.6 NA NA NA NA
Debit 60.4 58.6 1,890.0 36.6 34.8 39.5 63.8 31.4 NA NA NA NA
Equity, net 1.3 1.2 -1,860.8 1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.4 0.00 6.3
Credit 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.4 0.00 6.3
Debit 0.00 0.00 1,862.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other capital, net -13.8 57.2 9.6 -7.7 3.5 -6.1 -39.1 8.5 -20.6 20.2 -26.3 23.5
Credit 46.6 115.8 37.5 28.9 38.4 33.4 24.7 39.9 31.6 55.4 32.5 80.0

























a See MNB (2014h).
Source: Own compilation based on MNB (2015f, 2015g).
a Balance of payments data, outflows minus inflows.
Source: CBR (2015b).
Table 9. Russian FDI flows into Hungary, according to data provided by the Central Bank of Hungary, BPM6 methodology,a
quarterly data, 2014 (Millions of euros)
Table 10. Russian FDI flows into Hungary, according to data provided by the Central Bank of Russia, quarterly data, net, 
2007 – Q3 2014 (Millions of dollars)a
Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2014
Excluding SPEs 18.9 0.8 16.2 408.0
Excluding SPEs as well as capital in transit and restructuring of asset portfolios 18.9 0.8 16.2 57.3
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
6 1 2 3 4 6 1 2 3 4 6 1 2 3 4 6 1 2 3 4 6 1 2 3 4 6 1 2 3 4 6 1 2 3 6
Total 51 473 22 25 21 542 2 1,781 4 2 1,789 2 3 4 39 48 -23 2 -2,713 10 -2,724 8 20 30 9 67 32 48 57 18 155 18 9 16 43
Equity 51 447 3 7 5 462 2 1,781 4 2 1,789 2 3 4 -1 8 15 7 -2,713 10 -2,681 8 20 30 31 89 32 32 32 16 112 17 9 16 42
Reinvested earnings 0 27 19 18 16 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 0 0 -4 0 0 0 -21 -21 0 0 24 0 24 0 0 0 0
Debt instruments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 40 -38 0 0 0 -38 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 2 1 19 1 0 0 1
Table 11. Russian FDI flows into Hungary, according to data provided by the Central Bank of Hungary,
BPM5 methodology,a detailed breakdown, yearly data, 2001–2012 (Millions of euros)
a See MNB (2014g).





Equity capital Other capital
Total
Increase Decrease Net earnings
and reinvested Liabilities, Assets, Net 
earnings net net liabilities
(1) (2)
(3) = (1) 
(4) (5) = (3) + (4) (6) (7)
(8) = (6) (9) = (5) 
– (2) – (7) + (8)
Excluding SPEs
2001 6.7 0.1 6.6 16.5 23.1 -1.4 0.7 -2.1 21.0
2002 0.3 7.2 -7.0 11.2 4.2 -8.5 0.5 -9.0 -4.8
2003 0.5 0.6 -0.1 12.8 12.7 0.9 0.2 0.7 13.4
2004 1.3 0.3 1.0 14.9 15.9 -2.2 -0.2 -2.0 13.9
2005 1.6 1.1 0.4 -7.3 -6.8 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 -7.4
2006 5.0 0.6 4.4 -1.0 3.4 -0.4 2.6 -3.0 0.3
2007 1.7 0.4 1.3 -35.1 -33.8 -43.0 -1.8 -41.1 -74.9
2008 5.8 677.4 -671.5 5.8 -665.7 -25.4 56.2 -81.6- -747.3
2009 789.8 4.6 785.2 115.0 900.2 0.1 -1.0 1.1 901.3
2010 6.7 5.5 1.2 115.2 116.4 1.1 -152.3 153.4 269.9
2011 5.0 1,862.0 -1,857.0 10.0 -1,846.9 3.4 -41.9 45.3 -1,801.6
2012 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.0 6.0 -0.7 29.0 -29.7 -23.8
Including SPEs
2006 5.0 0.6 4.4 -0.9 3.5 -2.4 28.4 -30.8 -27.4
2007 28.9 0.6 28.3 -35.0 -6.7 -50.8 47.1 -97.9 -104.6
2008 5.8 677.4 -671.5 5.8 -665.7 -25.4 136.8 -162.2 -827.9
2009 789.8 4.6 785.2 115.1 900.3 0.1 -264.5 264.6 1,164.9
2010 6.7 5.5 1.2 115.2 116.5 1.1 -153.4 154.5 271.0
2011 5.0 1,862.0 -1,857.0 10.1 -1,846.9 3.4 -41.9 45.3 -1,801.6

























2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Excluding SPEsb
Total 21.0 -4.8 13.4 13.9 -7.4 0.3 -74.9 -747.3 901.2 269.9 -1,801.6 -23.4 29.1
Equity 23.1 4.2 12.7 15.9 -6.8 3.4 -33.8 -665.7 900.2 116.4 -1,846.9 6.0 7.4
Debt instruments -2.1 -9.0 0.7 -2.0 -0.6 -3.0 -41.1 -81.6 0.9 153.4 45.3 -29.3 21.7
Excluding SPEs as well as capital in transit and restructuring of asset portfolios
Total 21.0 -4.8 13.4 13.9 -7.4 0.3 -74.9 -747.3 901.2 269.9 -1,801.6 -23.4 29.1
Equity 23.1 4.2 12.7 15.9 -6.8 3.4 -33.8 -665.7 900.2 116.4 -1,846.9 6.0 7.4
Debt instruments -2.1 -9.0 0.7 -2.0 -0.6 -3.0 -41.1 -81.6 0.9 153.4 45.3 -29.3 21.7
Including SPEs
Total NA NA NA NA NA -27.4 -104.6 -827.9 1,164.7 271.0 -1,801.6 -26.8 20.9
Equity NA NA NA NA NA 3.5 -6.7 -665.7 900.3 116.5 -1,846.9 6.0 7.5
Debt instruments NA NA NA NA NA -30.8 -97.9 -162.2 264.5 154.5 45.3 -32.8 13.4
Table 12. Russian FDI flows into Hungary, according to data provided by the Central Bank of Hungary, 
BPM6 methodology,a yearly data, net, 2001–2013 (Millions of euros)
NA – Not available.a See MNB (2014h).
b As is apparent, the figures remain unchanged when capital in
transit and restructuring of asset portfolios are excluded.
Source: Own compilation based on MNB (2015a, 2015b, 2015c).
Table 13. Russian FDI flows into Hungary, according to data provided by the Central Bank of Hungary,











fellows fellowsb fellows fellowsb
Excluding SPEsc
2001 21.0 6.6 6.6 0.0 16.5 -2.1 -2.1 0.0
2002 -4.8 -7.0 -7.0 0.0 11.2 -9.0 -9.0 0.0
2003 13.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 12.8 0.7 0.7 0.0
2004 13.9 1.0 1.0 0.0 14.9 -2.0 -2.0 0.0
2005 -7.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 -7.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.0
2006 0.3 4.4 4.4 0.0 -1.0 -3.0 -3.0 0.0
2007 -74.9 1.3 1.3 0.0 -35.1 -41.1 -41.1 0.0
2008 -747.3 -671.5 -671.5 0.0 5.8 -81.6 -1.6 -80.0
2009 901.2 785.2 785.2 0.0 115.0 0.9 1.1 -0.2
2010 269.9 1.2 1.2 0.0 115.2 153.4 1.5 152.0
2011 -1,801.6 -1,857.0 -1,857.0 0.0 10.0 45.3 3.3 42.1
2012 -23.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 -29.3 -13.2 -16.1
2013 29.1 11.9 11.9 0.0 -4.5 21.7 10.5 11.2
Excluding SPEs as well as capital in transit and restructuring of asset portfolios
2001 21.0 6.6 6.6 0.0 16.5 -2.1 -2.1 0.0
2002 -4.8 -7.0 -7.0 0.0 11.2 -9.0 -9.0 0.0
2003 13.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 12.8 0.7 0.7 0.0
2004 13.9 1.0 1.0 0.0 14.9 -2.0 -2.0 0.0
2005 -7.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 -7.3 -0.6 -0.6 0.0
2006 0.3 4.4 4.4 0.0 -1.0 -3.0 -3.0 0.0
2007 -74.9 1.3 1.3 0.0 -35.1 -41.1 -41.1 0.0
2008 -747.3 -671.5 -671.5 0.0 5.8 -81.6 -1.6 -80.0
2009 901.2 785.2 785.2 0.0 115.0 0.9 1.1 -0.2
2010 269.9 1.2 1.2 0.0 115.2 153.4 1.5 152.0
2011 -1,801.6 -1,857.0 -1,857.0 0.0 10.0 45.3 3.3 42.1
2012 -23.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 -29.3 -13.2 -16.1
2013 29.1 11.9 11.9 0.0 -4.5 21.7 10.5 11.2
Including SPEs
2006 -27.4 4.4 4.4 0.0 -0.9 -30.8 -30.8 0.0
2007 -104.6 28.3 28.3 0.0 -35.0 -97.9 -97.9 0.0
2008 -827.9 -671.5 -671.5 0.0 5.8 -162.2 -1.6 -160.6
a See MNB (2014h).
b Ultimate controlling parent is non-resident.
c As is apparent, the figures remain unchanged when capital in transit and restructuring of asset
portfolios are excluded.
Source: Own compilation based on MNB (2015a, 2015b, 2015c).
Table 14. Russian citizens residing in Hungary at the beginning of the year, 1995–2014
Source: KSH (2014).










fellows fellowsb fellows fellowsb
2009 1,164.7 785.2 785.2 0.0 115.1 264.5 1.1 263.4
2010 271.0 1.2 1.2 0.0 115.2 154.5 1.5 153.0
2011 -1,801.6 -1,857.0 -1,857.0 0.0 10.1 45.3 3.3 42.0
2012 -26.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 -32.8 -13.2 -19.6
2013 20.9 11.9 11.9 0.0 -4.4 13.4 10.5 2.9
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Russian 277 1,124 1,708 2,502 2,809 3,002 1,893 2,048 1,794 2,244
Total foreigners 138,101 139,954 142,506 148,263 150,245 153,125 110,028 116,429 115,888 130,109
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Russian 2,642 2,759 2,760 2,787 2,923 3,703 3,483 2,864 3,390 3,657
Total foreigners 142,153 154,430 166,030 174,697 184,358 197,819 206,909 143,361 141,357 140,536
